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This paper proposes a commercial development model, based on Fujita￿ s (1988) monopolistic com-
petition model of spatial agglomeration, to examine stores￿decisions to enter urban communities. The
model focuses on commercial developers and large stores, and identi￿es a potential holdup problem in the
commercial development market arising because developers incur costs before negotiating with anchor
tenants over pro￿t sharing; the holdup problem is more likely to occur in low-income communities where
the pro￿tability of commercial projects is small. The model predicts that direct incentives to developers
are preferred to general tax incentives for addressing this market failure.
JEL classi￿cation: R58, H50, H76
Key Words: urban redevelopment programs, economic agglomeration, holdup problem
1 Introduction
Commercial development is a popular urban revitalization strategy that has been implemented in many U.S.
cities including New York, Chicago, and Boston. Its popularity is founded on the belief that low-income
urban communities are under-served by stores. Residents in these communities spend a greater share of
their income shopping outside of their own neighborhoods. For example, in 1996 Chicago residents living in
the neighborhoods of Little Village and South Shore made about 62% and 70% of their purchases outside of
their neighborhoods, while residents of the average Chicago neighborhood made 37% of purchases outside
(Weissbourd and Berry (1999)). Lack of locally available commercial goods and services has a negative
impact on the welfare of inner-city residents, usually poor people who rely on public transportation (Glaeser
et al. (2008)).
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1According to estimates in New Markets: The Untapped Retail Buying Power In America￿ s Inner Cities,
a report by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Cuomo (1999)), U.S. inner-city
neighborhoods had an unmet retail demand of $8.7 billion. Despite this documented under-provision in
low-income urban communities, we know very little about the nature of this problem. Why don￿ t stores
enter these communities to meet the excess demand? The answer to this question has important policy
implications. If high crime rates in inner-city neighborhoods is what deters the entry of stores, then the
government should put more resources to reduce crime. Consistent with recent commercial revitalization
successes in urban low-income communities, this paper provides a model of commercial development to show
that low-income communities may be under-served because of lack of economic agglomeration and policies
should aim at generating necessary commercial agglomeration.
A well-known example is Harlem, New York, one of the six Round I federal urban Empowerment Zones.
Before Harlem was designated as an Empowerment Zone in 1994, it had not had any large scale commercial
development since the 1960s, and 70% of the shopping by Harlem residents was done outside of the neighbor-
hood, which had not had any large. With public subsidy to developers, the community saw the opening of
Harlem USA, a 275,000 square-foot retail and entertainment complex, in 2000 and the opening of East River
Plaza, a 485,000 square-foot retail shopping center that is home to Costco, Target, Best Buy, Marshalls, Old
Navy, PetSmart, Bob￿ s Discount Furniture, and many other tenants, in 2009. In 2010, three developers1
announced on the same day total planned investment of about $116 million in commercial development
projects in Harlem.
The commercial development model in Section 2 builds on existing monopolistic competition models of
spatial agglomeration (Fujita (1988)), in which consumers have a taste for di⁄erent varieties of goods and
services (Spence (1976), and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) and have to incur travel costs to the location where
goods and services are provided. For a given travel cost, consumers are more likely to shop at a place with
more varieties of goods and services; his consumption pattern creates positive demand externalities among
commercial goods and services that agglomerate at the same location: more choices attract more consumers
and lead to higher revenues (Arakawa (2006), Henkel et al. (2000)).
The ￿rst innovation of this model is to demonstrate the importance of demand externalities in stores￿
decision to enter a community, an aspect that, to my knowledge, has not been investigated in the literature.
With ￿xed costs in commercial provision (e.g., rent paid to a landlord and wages paid to some minimum
required number of workers), stores at a location with a very limited number of varieties may incur losses
because of low consumer tra¢ c and revenues. Without a proper coordination mechanism, the market may fail
to achieve necessary commercial agglomeration and end up at an ine¢ cient equilibrium with under-provision
of commercial opportunities despite the existence of a more e¢ cient and pro￿table alternative equilibrium.
The second innovation is to model the coordination mechanism in the commercial market and to inves-
tigate the nature of the under-provision problem in low-income communities. Current commercial develop-
1Janus Partners LLC and Monadnock Construction Inc. and Artimus
2ments often involve two types of agents ￿ commercial developers and large stores. A developer acts as the
planner of a commercial development project and large stores serve as anchor tenants. This arrangement
creates a synergy and is bene￿cial for both parties. Without a developer, a large store will have no mech-
anism to charge nearby specialized stores for the positive demand externalities they generate. Most likely,
owners of the properties that are occupied by these specialized stores will capture the bene￿ts through either
an increase in rent or property value appreciation.2 A developer, through lease contracts with all stores in a
commercial center, will be able to internalize the demand externalities around a commercial center. However,
a developer cannot start a project without anchor tenants, the large stores. The importance of anchor tenants
to a commercial development project is a result of the need for economic agglomeration and the existence
of signi￿cant coordination costs. Recruiting small specialized stores to achieve necessary agglomeration may
be a bad option because of high coordination costs. According to the Urban Land Institution￿ s (ULI) Retail
Development Handbook (Kramer (2008), page 91), "as a rule, a shopping center will not be built until the
developer has secured commitments from key or anchor tenants." Anchor tenants, aware of their importance
in commercial development, will be able to negotiate with a developer for a share of pro￿ts. Evidence shows
that anchor tenants usually pay much lower rents than small tenants. According to the estimate in Pashigan
and Gould (1998), anchor stores receive a per foot rent subsidy of no less than 72 percent of the rent that
non-anchor stores pay. Gould et al. (2005) point out that "the most striking feature of anchor contracts is
that most anchors either do not pay any rent or pay only a trivial amount".
A successful commercial development requires the cooperation of two powerful parties, but one party, the
developer, has to incur signi￿cant costs before negotiating over pro￿t sharing. Before searching for suitable
anchor tenants, a developer has to perform a market analysis, a site suitability analysis, and a regulatory
review, which can easily cost half a million dollars (Kramer (2008)). More importantly, the search process
can be costly in terms of time and money. Stores that can serve as anchors in a commercial center usually
have their own expansion plans and market targets. For example, in 1998, Barnes & Noble decided not
to sign a lease with Harlem USA, the ￿rst large-scale commercial development in Harlem, New York for
half a century, whose developer had been trying to persuade the bookstore to open a shop in the center
since 1992. Eventually, Harlem USA signed a bookseller, Hue Man Books in 2000. All costs incurred before
the negotiation with anchor tenants are sunk to the developer. At the point of negotiation, anchor tenants
have no incentive to share these costs. A developer must anticipate sharing the payo⁄s from a commercial
development with anchor tenants, but bear the pre-negotiation costs alone. This represents a holdup problem
that arises when one party must pay the cost while others share in the payo⁄.3 A commercial project which
generates positive pro￿ts may not be pro￿table for a developer and therefore no action will be taken. This
situation is more likely to happen in low-income communities where the pro￿tability of a commercial project
2This happens if there are more potential small commercial business owners than the spaces that are close enough to bene￿t
from the large store￿ s consumer base.
3Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) study this kind of holdup problem in the labor market. Proposed market solutions usually
require the agents to take actions (e.g., forming joint ventures) before incurring costs. However, in the case of retail development,
the costs must be sunk before the developer meets the anchor tenants.
3is slim to start with.
The commercial market failure in low-income communities justi￿es government intervention. Section 3
analyzes how government policies help to solve the under-provision problem. The key is to induce actions
by developers. Incentives provided directly to developers for projects in under-served communities, in the
form of block grants, low-interest loans, or accelerated deductions, should work. General tax incentives to
capital or labor may be less e⁄ective. In some communities, general tax incentives may not be big enough
to trigger developers￿actions. If, in some communities, they do induce developers to invest, they will also
lead developers to over-supply shopping spaces and generate unnecessary revenue loss to anchor stores.
The policy analysis contributes to the growing literature on place based policies.4 As Gottlieb and Glaeser
(2008) and Kline (2010) point out, justi￿cation of place based policies requires better understanding of the
structure of agglomeration economies. This paper shows that commercial revitalization incentives as place
based policies are welfare enhancing. There will be more private investment, pro￿ts, permanent jobs, and
sustainable economic activities in communities that successfully implement these policies.
Analysis of the welfare redistribution e⁄ect of commercial revitalization projects suggests that home
owners and large stores that serve as anchor tenants of newly-developed commercial centers are sure winners.
Existing community residents who rent their houses may not bene￿t if the increase in their consumer surplus
from easier access to commercial goods and services drives up rents in the neighborhood.
2 A model of neighborhood commercial development
This section develops a model of commercial development to analyze the entry of stores in a community.
Following Fujita (1988), I assume that each individual occupies a residence in the community and derives
utility from the consumption of a variety of commercial goods and services. In order to purchase the goods
and services, consumers have to incur a travel cost to get to the location where the goods and services are
provided. The production of each variety of commercial goods and services is symmetric and requires a ￿xed
cost.
The commercial market is composed of commercial developers, multi-variety stores (large stores), and
single-variety stores (specialized stores).
2.1 Consumers
Consider a circular community. Housing is homogeneous and uniformly distributed along the circumference
of a unit circle. Residents of the community earn identical income y and consume a variety of goods and
4See Gottlieb and Glaeser (2008) for reviews.










where n is the number of varieties of goods and services available , and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among varieties of goods and services. The larger the ￿, the weaker the consumer preference for variety.
For simplicity, I normalize the consumption of housing services h to 1. To purchase any of these goods and
services, consumers incur costly travel to the physical place where the varieties are o⁄ered.
Suppose there is a shopping center in the community (I will refer to it as "the community shopping
center" (CSC)) that provides n varieties of goods and services. For community residents, the travel cost t
to the CSC increases with the distance z between their residence and the CSC.
Outside of the community there is a shopping center that provides no varieties of goods and services (I
will refer to this shopping center as "the outside shopping center" (OSC)). The travel cost to the OSC is to
for all community residents.
Assume that, for all community residents, it is always less costly to travel to the CSC than to the OSC.
In other words, t(z) < to for z 2 [0;1=2]; 2) the OSC o⁄ers weakly more varieties of goods and services than
the CSC, i.e., no > n; and 3) the price of the same variety is the same in the OSC and the CSC.5
The consumption decision of residents consists of two steps: ￿rst they decide where to purchase goods
and services, and second they decide how much of each variety to purchase. Because residents can buy more
varieties at the OSC at the same price, residents who travel to the OSC have no incentive to make another
trip to the CSC. Therefore, no consumer will travel to both the OSC and the CSC. A consumer either travels
to the CSC at a lower travel cost but fewer varieties or travels to the OSC for more varieties but a higher
travel cost.
The consumers￿problem is solved by backward induction. Consider a resident who lives distance z away
from the CSC (I will call this consumer "consumer z"). Suppose she purchases goods and services at the
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x(j)p(j)dj + t(z) ￿ y.
From the ￿rst order conditions of consumer z￿ s utility maximization problem, we get her demand for con-
5We can see from the next subsection, when production of the varieties are symmetric in the OSC and the CSC, the price
of the varieties will be the same.
5sumption of variety j
x(j;z) =
￿













is the aggregate price index for goods and services available at the CSC.
Consumer z￿ s indirect utility from purchasing goods and services at the CSC will be
U(z) =
y ￿ ph ￿ t(z)
P(n)
.
The indirect utility that residents get from patronizing the OSC is
Uo =













is the aggregate price index for goods and services available at the OSC.
Consumer z will choose to purchase goods and services at the CSC if U(z) > Uo. He will choose the
OSC if U(z) < Uo. Let e z be the distance that makes a resident indi⁄erent between the CSC and the OSC,
i.e., U(e z) = Uo. Without loss of generality, assume that travel costs t(z) = tz are a linear, increasing (t > 0)
function in z, the distance between a consumer￿ s residence and the CSC. We can solve U(e z) = Uo to get
e z =
y ￿ ph ￿
P(n)
P(no)(y ￿ ph ￿ to)
t
.
The resident who lives e z distance away from the CSC is the marginal customer at the CSC. Residents
who live closer to the CSC than the marginal customer, z ￿ e z, will patronize the CSC. Residents who live
farther to the CSC than the marginal customer, z > e z will patronize the OSC.
2.2 Production of commercial goods and services
The production of variety j requires one unit of land and a ￿xed labor input ￿(j). In addition to these ￿xed
inputs, each unit of variety j requires ￿(j) units of labor to produce. Assume the commercial market is small
relative to the size of the local economy, so labor is supplied competitively at price w and land is supplied
competitively at price r. The pro￿t function for producers of variety j at the CSC is
￿(j) = q(j)[p(j) ￿ ￿(j)w] ￿ ￿(j)w ￿ r:
where q(j) is the total demand for variety j at the CSC, The varieties are assumed be produced under
monopolistic competition: the supplier of variety j takes P(n) and P(no) as given and chooses p(j) to
6maximize its pro￿t. The ￿rst order condition for this the pro￿t-maximization problem yields an expression





Assuming that production of varieties is symmetric at both the OSC and the CSC, each variety will have
the same price, p(j) = p = ￿
￿￿1￿w. Therefore, P(n) = n
1
1￿￿p, P(no) = n
1
1￿￿
o p. The quantity of variety
purchased by consumer z is
x(j;z) = x(z) (1)
=
￿






y ￿ ph ￿ tz
np
=





An increase in n reduces x(z), the quantity purchased by each consumer who shops at the CSC. When
there are more varieties at the CSC, consumers who shop at the CSC buy more varieties but less of each
variety.
The marginal customer e z at the CSC is
e z =
y ￿ ph ￿
P(n)
P(no)(y ￿ ph ￿ to)
t
=
y ￿ ph ￿ ( n
no)
1
1￿￿(y ￿ ph ￿ to)
t
: (2)
Equation (2) implies that the weaker consumer preference for variety (the bigger the ￿), the smaller the
number of varieties the CSC needs to attract the same number of consumers, and that the more competitive
the OSC (the bigger the no or the smaller to), the larger the number of varieties the CSC needs to attract
the same number of consumers.





















no. This means that increasing the number of varieties will not attract more consumers
when all community residents shop at the CSC, which means that consumers who live outside low-income





































x(z)dz] ￿ ￿w ￿ r (3)
The number of varieties at the CSC a⁄ects the pro￿ts generated by each variety at the CSC through its
impact on the quantity purchased by each consumer and the number of consumers.
2.3 Commercial agglomeration and coordination
Commercial agglomeration of commercial goods and services means that the pro￿t of each variety increases
with the number of varieties in a commercial center. Equation (3) shows that the pro￿t of a variety is
an increasing function of the total demand for the variety. This means that the source of commercial
agglomeration is demand externalities.
An increase in n increases the consumer mass ( @e z
@n > 0) and reduces quantity demanded by each consumer
(
@x(z)
@n < 0). When the number of varieties is small, the positive impact on consumer mass dominates.
Commercial goods and services producers all enjoy the positive demand externality they generate. When
the number of varieties is large, the negative impact on per-consumer consumption dominates. For a speci￿c
community, there exists a number of varieties that maximizes the pro￿t generated for producers of each
variety.
Substitute equation (1) and (2) into equation (3), to get the pro￿t of each variety provided at the CSC
￿ = f




















































The agglomeration economies of commercial goods and services is illustrated in Proposition 1, which shows



















Proof. See Appendix A.1
To understand the importance of economic agglomeration e⁄ects in stores￿decision to enter a community,
imagine a commercial market with only symmetric single-variety stores ("specialized stores" from now on).
We can think of these stores as small businesses like candle stores, dry cleaners, bakeries, and other stores
6n￿ is the optimal commercial agglomeration for each variety and is di⁄erent from the optimal commercial agglomeration
for a commercial center.
8that sell one type of product. I will focus on communities with ￿(n￿) > 0. Communities with ￿(n￿) < 0
are not an interesting case because entry of stores is not their only problem. These communities will not be
able to sustain a shopping center without further government subsidy, even if the government built a CSC
with n￿ varieties of goods and services.
We are more interested in understanding why stores do not enter communities with ￿(n￿) > 0, where
they can earn positive operating pro￿ts. Proposition 2 shows that an ine¢ cient outcome can arise in these
communities when the commercial market is composed of symmetric specialized stores:
Proposition 2 If a commercial market is composed of symmetric specialized stores, for a community with
￿(n￿) > 0, no goods and services provided in the community, n = 0, is a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition is that a specialized store will not enter a community when there is no commercial agglom-
eration to generate positive pro￿ts. A market with only specialized stores will face a coordination problem,
which leads to the ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome of no CSC in communities with ￿(n￿) > 0.
Successful commercial agglomeration of specialized stores with no explicit market coordination mechanism
usually rely on the presence of natural amenities such as beaches or historical attractions. For communities
without such natural amenities, this kind of commercial ￿ ourishing may not happen.
2.4 A commercial market with developers, multi-variety stores, and specialized
stores
The existence of a pro￿table alternative equilibrium creates an opportunity for agents who have coordination
ability.7 In the commercial market, these agents are commercial developers and multi-variety stores (large
stores). Commercial development processes in current market conditions usually requires the cooperation of a
developer and one or more multi-variety stores. This arrangement is mutually bene￿cial because developers
and multi-variety stores have di⁄erent coordination abilities. A multi-variety store contains within-store
agglomeration of varieties and will have more consumer visits. Commercial developers specialize in identifying
a suitable locations, creating the right store mix, and managing lease contracts for a commercial project. It
may be too costly for a multi-variety store to acquire the planning ability of a commercial developer8 and
for a developer to coordinate small business to the necessary commercial agglomeration.
The commercial development model is based commonly observed commercial development processes
which involve developers, large stores, and specialized stores. A developer is the central planner of a com-
mercial center, large stores are anchor tenants, and specialized stores ￿ll shopping spaces that are not
occupied by anchor tenants. A commercial center is assumed to last for in￿nite time periods once developed.
7Rauch (1993) demonstrates that developers of industrial parks can eliminate the ine¢ cient city-industry location equilibrium
when the pro￿ts are large enough.
8One exception is Wal-Mart, which has a division, Walmart Realty, specializing in commercial development located in or
around Wal-Mart Stores.
9All relevant decisions are made in period 0 in three stages:
￿ Stage 1: a developer makes the decision to enter a community or not. If the developer decides to enter,
then he incurs a cost to identify a suitable site, choose the size of the commercial center, and searches
for potential anchor tenants.
￿ Stage 2: the developer meets with large stores that are potential anchor tenants and negotiates the
anchor tenant contracts.
￿ Stage 3: the developer purchases land, constructs the shopping center, and leases the rest of the retail
spaces to specialized stores.
From period 1 on, the commercial center operates and the parties execute the contracts signed in period
0.9
The period 0 commercial development game is solved using backward induction. In the third stage,
the developer interacts with specialized stores. Assume there are a large number of entrepreneurs who can
manage a specialized store in a CSC. These potential small business owners compete for the limited retail
spaces available in the shopping center. The competition allows the developer to o⁄er leases that extract all
the expected pro￿ts from specialized stores. According to the Kramer (2008), "for a retail center with major
tenants, smaller tenants represent the largest income potential for the project. Although major tenants
may be the primary generator of customer tra¢ c and the ￿nancial foundation for attracting initial capital
commitments, in-line shops pay higher rents and generate the greatest pro￿ts for the developer." Let rs be
the rent that a specialized store pays for each period. Since no specialized store makes any pro￿t, we solve
￿(n) + r ￿ rs = 0 and get rs = ￿(n) + r, which is the maximum rent for a space.
Given the size of a shopping center, the developer would like to have more spaces leased to specialized
stores. However, the developer has a constraint on the spaces leased to specialized stores. Suppose at the
third stage, the developer let entrepreneurs bid for slots in the CSC that are not occupied by anchor stores.
If the number of varieties committed to the shopping center is so small that no store makes positive "before-
rent pro￿t", ￿(n) + r < 0, then no entrepreneur will be interested in bidding for one slot, assuming that
there is no negative rent bid, i.e., rs > 0. To start the bidding, a developer has to commit at least n0 varieties
at the second stage such that ￿(n0) + r = 0. For n 2 (n0;n￿], we know ￿(n) + r > 0.
In the second stage, the developer and anchor stores negotiate over the total payo⁄s from the CSC,
denoted by V .10 For a CSC with n varieties, the total pro￿t each period equals n￿(n). Let i > 0 be the
interest rate. The discounted present value of total pro￿ts V over the life of the CSC equals 1+i
i n￿(n).
Assume the division of V is characterized by a Nash bargaining solution. Let ￿ 2 [0;1] be the share that
9Renegotiation is not allowed in the model for simplicity. If we allow a positive probability of renegotiation after a de-
veloper incurs more site-speci￿c investment, a developer will be more reluctant to invest in low-income communities because
renegotiation allows anchor tenants to get larger payo⁄s.
10Bargaining over rents anchor tenants pay and over the total payo⁄ are theoretically the same. There are cases that anchor
tenants do not pay rents and also pay lower operation costs.
10goes to anchor stores. A bigger ￿ means more bargaining power for the anchor tenants. The payo⁄ to the
developer is (1 ￿ ￿)V .
In the ￿rst stage, the developer incurs a cost c. The cost c is sunk when the developer negotiates with
anchor tenants in the second stage, so the developer would not be able to convince the anchor tenants to




(1 ￿ ￿)n￿(n) ￿ c.
From the ￿rst-order condition of the developer￿ s pro￿t maximization problem, we get
n￿￿ = [
2(y ￿ ph ￿ to)2
















1￿￿(y ￿ ph ￿ to)2
tn￿￿￿
￿ ￿w ￿ r] ￿ c.
The derivation is in Appendix A.3. If Vd(n￿￿) > 0, the developer will incur the cost c to initiate the
development of a CSC. If Vd(n￿￿) < 0, the developer will not initiate the project.
Proposition 3 shows that a developer￿ s maximum pro￿t from a CSC increases with the average level of
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In reality, income per square mile is an important determinant of project revenue and is frequently
found in feasibility reports for commercial development projects (Kramer (2008)). Other things equal, a
community with higher income per square mile will have larger purchasing power and a higher demand. It is
not surprising that commercial developments in high-income communities are more pro￿table. This means
that, if make simultaneous developments in all communities are impossible due to exogenous constraints,
richer communities will have a higher priority and get commercial development earlier. This result alone
does not imply that low-income communities will persistently be under-served by commercial goods and
services suppliers.
Persistent under-provision may happen in low-income communities due to the holdup problem that arises
when payo⁄s are shared while costs are not. In the commercial development game, the total payo⁄s from
a CSC are shared by the developer and anchor stores but pre-negotiation costs are borne entirely by the
developer. Proposition 4 shows that, in some communities, a CSC may be pro￿table but will not get built
because the developer￿ s share of the payo⁄ will not cover the pre-negotiation costs:
11Proposition 4 For y 2 [y1;y2) such that V (y1) ￿ c = 0 and Vd(y2) = (1 ￿ ￿)V (y2) ￿ c = 0, V (y) ￿ c > 0
and Vd(y) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Communities with income level between y1 and y2 will be under-served by stores because potentially
pro￿table commercial developments are held up by anchor tenants, who will grab a share of the payo⁄s
through anchor contracts and will not share the costs that are sunk to a developer before the negotiation.
While this behavior will not deter a developer￿ s decision to invest in communities with y > y2, because a
developer will still make positive pro￿t (Vd(y) > 0 for y > y2) on these projects, it will deter a developer￿ s
decision to invest in communities with y 2 [y1;y2) even though a CSC will be sustainable and pro￿table in
these communities. This market failure can be addressed by government policies.
3 Urban development policies
3.1 Incentives to developers
The market failure in communities with income level between y1 and y2 justi￿es government intervention.
Based on the model, the key to address this market failure is to increase the developer￿ s returns to make the
developer at least break even on the project. First, consider a lump-sum grant g to a developer. The impact
of a lump-sum grant is summarized in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5 For a community with y 2 [y1;y2), a lump-sum grant g > ￿Vd(y) to a developer will induce
the developer to build a CSC in this community and generate
1. private investment from the developer 1+i
i rn￿￿ + c;
2. permanent jobs ￿n￿￿Q(n￿￿) + ￿n￿￿;




4. net pro￿ts V (n￿￿) ￿ c > 0;




0 [U(n￿￿;z) ￿ Uo]dz > 0.11
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Other incentives, for example low-interest loans and accelerated deductions, to a developer with a value
equivalent to g can also induce the developer to act in under-served communities, like a lump-sum grant.
Once a CSC is established in a community with y 2 [y1;y2), it will operate pro￿tably without further
government subsidy, and generate permanent jobs and sustainable economic activity in this community.
11The increase in consumer surplus does not guarantee a welfare increase for existing community residents.
12Proposition 5 suggests that providing incentives directly to a developer is welfare enhancing due to the
positive net pro￿ts generated and the increase in consumer surplus. The developer￿ s investment in land and
the jobs created at the CSC are not considered net gains for a community. In reality, attracting private
investment, creating jobs, and stimulating sustainable economic activities in distressed urban communities
are important policy goals and included in empirical evaluation standards for local development programs,
because low-income urban communities often su⁄er from high unemployment rates, deterioration of real
property, and low levels of economic activity. Commercial revitalization through direct subsidy to developers
has been used successfully in a number of US federal urban Empowerment Zones. As discussed in the
introduction, commercial development spurred through grants from an Empowerment Zone has revived
Harlem.
The success of commercial revitalization as a place-based policy, which emphasizes positive changes
in a targeted location, does not guarantee its success as a people-based policy, which emphasizes welfare
improvement for people living in a targeted location. A closer look at the welfare redistribution of the net
pro￿ts generated by a CSC shows that owners of anchor stores of a CSC are sure winners because they get
a positive pro￿t of ￿V (n￿￿), and that the developer is likely to be a winner if the size of the block grant
g exceeds the loss c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)V (n￿￿). Owners of specialized stores make zero pro￿t due to competition for
the limited retail spaces in the CSC. Generally, owners of specialized stores are more likely to be residents
of the community than owners of anchor stores and developers, which means the pro￿t from commercial
revitalization is more likely to go to people who are not residents of the community.
The distribution of the net gain from the increased consumer surplus depends on the ownership of local
residential property and the local residential rental market. Residents who own their home keep the consumer
surplus while they live in their houses and capitalize the consumer surplus into the price when they sell their
homes. Residents who rent will be able to keep the increase in consumer surplus from shopping at the CSC,
U(n￿￿;z) ￿ Uo, if there are enough vacant residential rental properties in the community. Otherwise, they
may not bene￿t from the CSC because the increase in consumer surplus is location dependent, and can be
extracted by property owners through an increase in rents.
The welfare of existing residents who rent can decrease if commercial revitalization induces gentri￿cation
and forces them to move out of the community.12 In 2008, the black population in central Harlem was about
77,000, the lowest since the 1920s, while total population increased from about 109,000 in 2000 to 126,000 in
2008. The relationship between the decline of the black population and the commercial revitalization success
in this community is an issue that warrants further investigation.
12The communities are assumed to be closed to immigration, so I cannot analyze gentri￿cation in this model. I make the
assumption of closed communities to investigate the impact of income-segregation on the provision of commercial goods and
services. An alternative model includes a distribution of communities sorted by housing prices and an income distribution for
residents. A CSC in a low income community can induce some residents of high-income high-housing-price communities to
move to low income communities because of the lower housing prices, which will drive up the housing price in the low income
community and force existing residents of the low income community in the lower tail of the community income distribution to
move.
133.2 General tax incentives
Incentives provided directly to commercial developers have been used by spatially targeted economic devel-
opment programs, such as the federal Community Renewal Initiative that was began in 1994. In addition
to Employment Tax Credits, the six Round I federal urban Empowerment Zones that participated in the
Community Renewal Initiative each received $100 million in the form of Title XX Social Services Block
Grant (SSBG) Funds, some of which were used as incentives to commercial developers. In December 2000,
the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act authorized 28 urban (and 12 rural) Renewal Communities. Each
designated community may authorize up to $12 million in Commercial Revitalization Deduction (not more
than $10 million per project) each year from December 31, 2001 to January 1, 2010.
General tax incentives are more commonly used incentives in spatially targeted economic development
programs. Before the federal Community Renewal Initiative program began in 1994, 37 states and the
District of Columbia had enacted Enterprise Zone programs. Each of these programs had elements unique
to the states, but the most common elements included in these programs were general tax incentives.
Evaluation of the Round I federal urban Empowerment Zones (Hebert et al. (2001), Busso et al. (2010))
found more encouraging outcomes than assessments of state enterprise zones, which generally failed to ￿nd
signi￿cant improvements. Busso et al. (2010) report evidence that some of the positive improvements in the
Round I federal urban Empowerment Zones may be the result of block grants rather than tax credits, and
emphasize that disentangling the e⁄ectiveness of block grants and employment tax credits is necessary to
reconcile the assessment of the Round I federal Empowerment Zones and the state enterprise zones. The
following analysis o⁄ers an explanation for the di⁄erence in the context of urban commercial revitalization
projects.
Assume that employment tax abatements take the form of tax rebates, i.e., they e⁄ectively lower labor
costs regardless of the pro￿tability of a ￿rm.13 Let s be an e⁄ective wage subsidy that is equivalent to the
employment tax rebates. Under employment tax rebates, the e⁄ective labor costs of the stores are w(1￿s).
The developer will choose
ns = [
2(y ￿ ph ￿ to)2







and will enter this community if Vd(ns;w;r;y) > 0.
In this context, employment tax abatements are inferior to incentives to developers for two reasons.
First, conditioned on inducing commercial developments, the minimum revenue costs to government using
employment tax incentives will be much larger than the equivalent minimum incentives to a developer,
because, under employment tax incentives, the government will also lose tax revenue to anchor tenants and
developers will over-supply retail spaces (ns > n￿￿) in order to get more tax bene￿ts.
13Employment tax credits in federal urban Empowerment Zones can only be claimed against taxable pro￿ts of a ￿rm that
employs workers. In this model, specialty stores do not make any pro￿t and the developer does not employ any workers (once
the commercial center is developed). None of them would be able to access the employment credit under the current market
structure.
14Second, and more importantly, if s is not large enough, Vd(ns;w;r;y) will not be su¢ ciently positive and
will not induce developers to invest in under-served communities. We can hardly expect such policies to
work in under-served urban communities, because the size of the employment tax credits is determined at
the federal level and is uniform across all empowerment zones. This one-size-￿ts-all federal policy is unlikely
to be the right size for many under-served communities. If employment tax incentives induce developers to
invest in some communities, these communities will likely have an income level close to y2. This prediction
is consistent with empirical evidence from the literature on the e⁄ectiveness of general tax incentives, which
suggest that general tax incentives are most likely to work in areas with lower unemployment rates and
higher income to begin with (Goss and Phillips (1999) and Goss and Phillips (2001)).
Although general tax incentives can induce commercial development in under-served communities, the
model developed here predicts that policies based on incentives to developers may be more e⁄ective. This
prediction explains observed outcomes in under-served urban communities based on the assessment of state
and federal urban revitalization policies.
4 Conclusion
The commercial development model developed here takes into account the importance and costs of economic
agglomeration in the entry decision of stores, and explains the documented under-provision of commercial
goods and services in low-income urban communities in the U.S.. It has a number of important implica-
tions for commercial revitalization policy in urban communities. Clearly, if the problem facing low-income
communities is that a developer￿ s share of the payo⁄s generated by a commercial project cannot cover the
pre-negotiation costs, an e⁄ective government policy is to provide incentives to a developer for projects in
under-served communities. General tax incentives alone are less likely to trigger commercial developers￿
investment in low-income communities, and may induce a developer to over-supply retail shopping spaces if
the tax incentives are large enough to induce the entry of a developer.
While the policy discussion here is based on commercial development, it also has implications for spa-
tially targeted economic development programs. If the problem in distressed urban communities stems from
di¢ culty achieving economic agglomeration, the existence of which has been generally accepted in the eco-
nomic geography literature, the general tax incentives appear to be unlikely to spur sustainable economic
development because of the non-linear nature of the agglomeration e⁄ect. Note that the failure of general
tax incentives does not invalidate place based policies as a whole. Policy makers should adopt policies that
trigger a non-linear increase in economic activities in order to generate the agglomeration economy needed
to ￿ght urban decline (GREENSTONE et al. (2010)) .
The literature on urban poverty (e.g., Kain (1968) and Wilson (1987)) has focused on the spatial mis-
match between employment opportunities and housing options for urban residents, which leads to higher
unemployment and lower income in inner city communities. This model shows that the welfare of inner
15city residents may be further reduced due to the under-provision of commercial goods and services in their
communities. The impact of the spatial mismatch between consumption opportunities and housing options
faced by low-income urban residents may be signi￿cant14 and is an area for further investigation.
14A growing public health literature (e.g., Larsen and Gilliland (2008) and Larson et al. (2009)) suggests that low-income
urban residents have reduced access to supermarkets and tend to have less healthier diets and higher levels of obesity.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The decision facing a specialized store is to enter a CSC or not. A store will choose to enter if it makes a
positive pro￿t.






no;n￿] such that ￿(e n) = 0 and
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In order for the suppliers of variety to make positive pro￿ts, a CSC has to provide at least e n varieties.
If n < e n, a specialized store will choose not to enter a CSC because ￿(n) < 0. Therefore, n = 0 is a Nash
equilibrium.
A.3 The developer￿ s pro￿t maximization problem
The developer￿ s pro￿t is Vd = 1+i
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Solving the ￿rst-order condition, ￿(n) + n
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@n = 0, we get
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
I use the envelope theorem to show that dVd
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We know that n￿￿ > n￿ because the developer chooses n￿￿ to maximize the total pro￿ts of n varieties
supplied, not the pro￿t of one variety, therefore
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20A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
V (y) ￿ c > 0 for y > y1 becausedV
dy > 0 and V (y1) ￿ c = 0:
Vd(y) < 0 for y ￿ y2 because dVd
dy = (1 ￿ ￿)dV
dy > 0 and Vd(y2) = (1 ￿ ￿)V (y2) ￿ c.
y1 = V ￿1(c) < y2 = V ￿1( c
1￿￿) because dV
dy > 0 and c < c
1￿￿.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
If y 2 [y1;y2), with a subsidy g > ￿Vd(y), the developer￿ s pro￿t will be Vd(y) + g > 0. Therefore, the
developer will purchase land with a value of 1+i
i rn￿￿ and incur cost c to build a CSC that provides n￿￿
variety of goods and services.
Every period, the producer of each variety employs ￿q(n￿￿)+￿ workers and generates revenue q(n￿￿)p =
￿
￿￿1q(n￿￿)￿w.
Since specialized stores do not make pro￿t, we ￿nd the total pro￿t by adding up the pro￿t of the developer
and the anchor tenants, which equals Vd(n￿￿) + g + ￿V (n￿￿) = V (n￿￿) + g ￿ c > g.
Consumers z 2 [0;z￿(n￿￿] gain utility from patronizing the CSC, U(n￿￿;z) ￿ Uo > 0. Every period, the




0 [U(n￿￿;z) ￿ Uo]dz > 0.
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